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Over the past ﬁfteen years, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan (hereafter referred to as Jordan) has experienced an in-
crease in poverty, inequality, and unemployment; volatile
economic growth and low productivity; a signiﬁcant increase
in nepotism and corruption in public institutions; a rise in
the rate of crime and civil violence; and pervasive lack of trust
not only between citizens themselves but also between them
and their formal institutions. This lack of general trust, ‘‘a cen-
tral element of social cohesion, or social capital” (World Bank,
2002, p. iii), is one of the main constraints to sustainable eco-
nomic growth and development in Jordan. It is also poten-
tially threatening to the country’s social cohesion and
political stability.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on
social capital (SC) by focusing on the role of public policy and
other main factors that aﬀect the level, type, and nature of SC
observed in a society, an area where ‘‘eﬀorts have been suc-
cessful only to a very limited degree” (Grootaert & Van Bastel-
aer, 2002, p.77). It thus attempts to answer a question that still
looms high in the literature on SC: ‘‘where does social capital
come from-and how might public policy aﬀect it?” (Miguel,
2003, p. 196).
Social networks and SC are a widespread phenomenon not
only in Jordan and the Arab World, but also in almost every
Muslim society beyond the region, including in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, former Soviet Muslim states, and Asia and Afri-
ca (see Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004; World Bank, 2002). While
this paper focuses on SC in Jordan, the latter’s case is informa-
tive and relevant to observers working on SC issues elsewhere.
With regard to the Arab World in particular, Singerman
(1995, p. xi) noted that because of high demands of everyday
life in an environment characterized by strong bureaucracy,
repression, and authoritarianism, people evolved and sus-
tained informal social networks that provide alternatives to1235formal resources of the state. In their work on Middle Eastern
societies, Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 1) also con-
cluded that informal and social networks remain a major
‘‘force in Middle Eastern societies,” determining most eco-
nomic and political outcomes. Yet, the literature on SC is lar-
gely characterized by absence of any contribution from the
Arab World (Francis, 2002, p. 8).
Jordan is chosen as a case study in order to ﬁll a gap in the
existing literature. Not unlike other Muslim societies of the re-
gion, Jordan is a country traditionally vibrant with social net-
works that operate on the basis of trust and reciprocity.
Jordan is also usually cited by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as a show case of reform and
globalization (Harrigan and El-Said, 2009a, 2009b). Yet, it is
a country experiencing increasing levels of inequality and pov-
erty. Jordan therefore provides an interesting case to study
factors that aﬀect SC and how the latter aﬀects and is aﬀected
by social and economic factors.
The paper argues that public policy and general political
and economic conditions are crucial factors that aﬀect the le-
vel and nature of SC in a country. Abrupt market reform and
increased poverty can force the poor to withdraw from vibrant
social networks that provide important opportunities and re-
sources. Thus wasta, an old but widespread phenomenon
and a signiﬁcant form of SC in the Arab World, becomes help-
ful during good times and destructive during bad times. We
will argue in this paper that this plus public policy, inﬂuenced
by the demands of local nationalists particularly after the 1971
1236 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcivil war, played a signiﬁcant role in undermining cross-cutting
ties in Jordan, thus weakening general trust, contributing to
increased poverty, social and economic polarization, and
political instability.
This paper is divided into ﬁve main sections. The next sec-
tion sets the theoretical framework by providing a deﬁnition
for and a description of the theory of SC. It also provides
empirical support for eﬀects of social capital, and the main
dimensions and questions that are usually used in assessing
the level of SC in a country. The third section describes the
general evolution of social capital in Jordan, including a back-
ground to the traditional networks that existed before political
independence in 1946. It also explores the way social capital
was aﬀected by the population movements of the 1948 and
1967 wars, as well as of the 1970–71 civil war in Jordan. The
fourth section attempts to measure the decline in the level,
and the change in the nature and function of SC in an environ-
ment characterized by increased poverty and scarcity over the
past ﬁfteen years. The ﬁnal section summarizes the main
points in the paper and concludes with some remarks.
2.
(a) Theoretical framework
The focal point of the theory of SC 1 is that ‘‘social net-
works,” which provide important assets and resources to their
members, ‘‘have value” that tend to improve productivity of
both individuals and groups in similar ways to physical capital
and human capital (Putnam, 2000, pp. 18, 19). In a similar
manner to a tractor (physical capital) and a training course
or years of experience (human capital) which can yield more
output (both individual and collective), social contacts can
also aﬀect individual and collective productivity.
While contentious debate remains over whether SC can be
called capital 2, very few doubt its value and importance,
and all agree that SC is ‘‘relationale” (Narayan, 1999, p. 20),
and ‘‘truly social” (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, p. 70).
To exist in the ﬁrst place, SC must be shared with others. As
Portes (1998) corroborated:
‘‘To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is
these others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advan-
tage” (Quoted in Narayan & Cassidy, 2001, p. 60).
The existence of networks and associations is thus necessary
for the creation of SC. The World Bank deﬁnes SC as ‘‘insti-
tutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern inter-
actions among people and contribute to economic and social
development” (Francis, 2002, p. 5). These interactions can af-
fect economic and social development in several ways
(Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, pp. 8, 9). For example, so-
cial networks create and also reduce the cost of accessing
important information that directly and indirectly aﬀect the
welfare of individuals and groups. Such information can relate
to jobs, contracts, inputs or suppliers and prices, location of
new markets and new technologies, sources of credit, or treat-
ment for diseases. A wide range of studies have empirically
supported this argument by emphasizing the role of social net-
works in facilitating access to such vital information. 3
Second, and as eluded to in the broad World Bank deﬁni-
tion of SC cited above, social networks foster certain attitudes
and values which govern interactions between individuals and
groups. These attitudes and values nourish and sustain certain
rules of conduct, based on mutual trust and obligation which
lead to reciprocity, create certain expectations, and simulta-
neously increase the volume and value of interactions amongindividuals and groups. Such sturdy norms of reciprocity also
help reduce the free rider problem and opportunistic behavior.
At a community level, mutual trust and reciprocity are of
primary importance particularly in countries and communities
where property rights are weakly developed or enforced, as is
the case in Jordan and most other Arab Middle Eastern states.
Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1260) argue that the impact of so-
cial capital or trust on growth should be higher in countries
with weak property rights, especially ‘‘if trust is more essential
where contracts are not reliably enforced by the legal system,
and where access to formal sources of credit is more limited
due to an underdeveloped ﬁnancial sector”. Under these cir-
cumstances, mutual trust and reciprocity can facilitate both
collective decision and action for public beneﬁt. Examples in-
clude mobilization to eﬀectively manage common resources
and maximization of their yield.
However, SC alone does not ensure better performance or
favorable economic and social outcomes. A host of other fac-
tors, including in particular the degree of group and commu-
nity homogeneity, government actions, and the overall
governance structure and environment, ‘‘have been shown to
have a critical bearing on the performance of collective
action” (Kahkonen, 2002, p. 266). Diﬀerent countries vary
in their eﬀectiveness, performance, regime type, and capacity
to inﬂuence their societies and communities. SC develops un-
der all types of states. But weak, hostile, corrupt states that
restrict associational life have a profoundly diﬀerent impact
on community life and development projects than states that
are transparent, ﬁght corruption, uphold the rule of law, hon-
or contracts, have fair and independent judiciary, promote
associational life, and respect civil liberties. The former, by
restricting associational life and not providing legal recogni-
tion for civil society organizations, undermine the SC of their
communities. They also undermine their own accountability
and credibility by preventing the emergence of vibrant civic
society that demands transparency and better governance
structure, and monitors the actions of state oﬃcials and there-
fore helps in reducing corruptive behavior (Knack & Keefer,
1997, p. 1252; Narayan, 1999).
In other words, SC and the state complement each other.
Local development programs and projects were found to have
a much higher rate of success in well-functioning central gov-
ernments (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, p. 4). The out-
come of SC is found to be more eﬀective and beneﬁcial in
countries that enjoy good governance (Putnam, 2000). These
states have also proven to have more social cohesion, political
stability, sustainable growth, and higher welfare indicators en-
joyed by their citizens (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004; Narayan,
1999; NESF, 2003; World Bank, 2002). Fafchamps (2006, pp.
1187, 1191 and 1196) has recently summarized the relationship
between SC and state in the following words:
‘‘Depending on the context, social capital can either complement or
substitute for formal institutions. . . without some form of voluntary
acceptance by the public, government eﬀorts to provide public goods
are likely to fail. Social capital is thus probably essential for public
good delivery. . . If the state is broken, why not ﬁx it. . . Investing in so-
cial capital should be seen as complement to investing in government
capacity. The two cannot and should not be separated.”
Much of the appeal of the SC concept comes from its capacity
to bring in and reﬂect the importance of not only the formal
institutions, but also the informal/normative aspects. The SC
framework is also accredited with enhancing our understanding
not only of the positive eﬀects of SC, but also of its negative and
less beneﬁcial ones. 4 To capture these eﬀects, Gittell and Vidal
(1998, p. 8) introduced the concepts of bonding and bridging
SC. Bonding SC refers to intra-community or intra-group net-
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ethnics, or other relatively ‘‘alike” groups bound together by
shared identities, interests, or place of residence. They are more
akin to the informal institutions referred to above, and provide
members with importantmaterial and non-material (physiolog-
ical and social) beneﬁts that allow them to ‘‘get by” in life.
However, the same networks that bind also exclude. They
create inward-looking groups and loyalties which narrows
down the circle of trust and mutual reciprocity. Such net-
works, though important, may lack suﬃcient information, re-
sources, and wider connections and links which are necessary
for development, poverty reduction, and risk pooling
(Putnam, 2000).
Bridging SC comes about when associations and connec-
tions cross social, geographical, and other speciﬁc identity
lines. Bridging SC is good for ‘‘getting ahead” 5 in life because
it provides a broader reach to those seeking social and eco-
nomic gains beyond their immediate communities. Bridging
SC is also important in establishing more generalized norms
of trust and reciprocity, which most political scientists con-
sider more valuable for social cohesion, political stability,
and economic development than speciﬁc forms of mutual trust
and reciprocity 6 (Fukuyama, 1995; Sobel, 2002).
SC therefore can be associated with negative consequences,
such as restriction of access to resources and opportunities,
restriction of individual freedom, excessive claims on success-
ful group members, and the emergence of powerful, tightly
knit social groups that are not accountable to society and that
can capture state institutions; use them to further their own
interests; and practice corruption, nepotism, and cronyism.
Hence, Narayan (1999, p. 12) argues that:
‘‘for societal well being or the collective good, a transition has to occur
from exclusive loyalty to primary social groups to networks of second-
ary associations whose most important characteristics is that they
bring together people who in some ways are diﬀerent from the self.”
It is within this framework that the issue of group homoge-
neity gains special interest. The empirical evidence on the im-
pact of social heterogeneity on SC and networks is ‘‘mixed”
(Kahkonen, 2002, p. 290; Krishna & Shrader, 2002, p. 21).
What is evidenced however is that while homogeneity makes
it easier to share and exchange information and facilitates
trust and collective action among speciﬁc groups, homogenous
groups may have similar information and limited resources.
Because they provide access to a larger pool of information,
opportunities, and resources, heterogeneous groups and net-
works ‘‘yield higher level of beneﬁts,” are better at pooling
risks, and can therefore provide better mechanisms to cope
with social and economic risks and crises (Grootaert et al.,
2004, p. 11). In fact, SC, particularly bridging SC that is pro-
moted via generalized trust in government institutions as well
as via interpersonal trust mobilized via clubs and networks, is
among the ‘‘fundamental determinants” of social cohesion
and political stability in heterogeneous societies (Fafchamps,
2006, p. 1182; Fukuyama, 1995).
To sum up, the main issue here is not one of an ‘‘either/or”
form of SC (Putnam, 2000, p. 23). Both are important and
serve diﬀerent objectives. Bonding SC is crucial for reducing
personal vulnerability, while bridging SC is important for
empowerment, social cohesion, and political stability. The
main aim of this paper is to trace the developments in these
two particular types of social capital in Jordan (bonding and
bridging), and to shed some light on the factors that can aﬀect
their evolution, nature, and extent in a country. There is a con-
sensus today among observers and scholars that while both
bonding and bridging social capital are important and providediﬀerent beneﬁts to members, too much bonding social capital,
or speciﬁc trust placed on limited groups based on kinship,
ethnic, or special interest ties will have potentially large nega-
tive consequences on economic performance, social cohesion,
and political stability. This type of organization will facilitate
rent-seeking activities among members and lead, especially un-
der high poverty and scarcity, to violent distributional con-
ﬂicts (see Knack & Keefer, 1997). The key challenge
therefore is in ﬁnding the right balance or ‘‘mix” between bon-
dingness and bridgingness (NESF, 2003, p. 34), a balance
which has gone drastically wrong in post-1971 Jordan.
(b) Measuring social capital
SC is not easy to measure. It is local and culture speciﬁc, and
therefore its assessment is usually beset by data diﬃculties on
the nature of local associations and networks (Grootaert &
Van Bastelaer, 2002). Intensive eﬀorts have been underway
to develop measures of SC, with World Bank staﬀ being at
the front of these eﬀorts. This has led to the emergence of a
general agreement on some important dimensions to evaluate
SC. Many of these dimensions were tested both qualitatively
and quantitatively across countries and were found to have
positive and signiﬁcant correlations in most cases. The follow-
ing were found to be the most common and frequent dimen-
sions of SC across societies: satisfaction with life; formal and
informal associations and membership in and quality of par-
ticipation in local community; generalized norms of trust
and reciprocity; political engagement and perception of gov-
ernment institutions; communications (including variables re-
lated to media and proximity variables); everyday sociability;
family, friends, and neighborhood connections; and the level
of safety and crime in a country 7 (Dasgupta & Serageldine,
1999; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002; Knack & Keefer,
1997; Narayan, 1999; Narayan & Cassidy, 2001; Putnam,
2000; Putnam, Leonardi, & Raﬀaella, 1993).
In reality, however, it is diﬃcult to neatly classify associa-
tions and networks as ‘‘‘either–or’ categories” since some net-
works and associations ‘‘bond along some intra-group social
dimension and simultaneously bridge across others” (Putnam,
2000, p. 23). Therefore, it is not possible to simply determine
in advance which of the components of the various measures
of SC discussed above were measures of bonding social capital
and which were measures of bridging social capital. Whether
an institution or network bonds along or simultaneously
bridges across others depends on the form of SC being ana-
lyzed and studied. This, in turn, is an empirical matter,
depending on the social, political, historical, and economic
context within which SC itself is embedded.
Several questions are generally employed to assess the vari-
ous dimensions of SC in a society. For example, the question
used to assess satisfaction with life is, ‘‘how happy are you in
life?”; to assess the level of trust in a society, ‘‘Generally speak-
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted?”; to assess
membership in formal or informal associations, ‘‘Are you. . . a
member of any groups, organizations, or associations?”; and
to assess the level and perception of trust in state oﬃcials
and institutions, ‘‘do you trust state oﬃcials?”, ‘‘Police and
security?” (see the ‘‘Social Capital Assessment Tool” in
Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002) and Knack and Keefer
(1997)). Such questions have been found to be very helpful
in gauging and generating useful information to assess the le-
vel and nature of SC in a society. Putnam’s seminal work on
SC (1995 and 2000) relied heavily on measures such as mem-
bership in voluntary associations, voting, and how generally
people feel about their lives.
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the authors themselves to generate data on the main dimen-
sions of SC cited above in Jordan. However, some of these
data are now readily available as a result of several surveys
and polls that have been carried out recently, and in some
cases regularly, by several independent sources in Jordan. Sec-
tion 4a, which relies overwhelmingly on these sources in its at-
tempt to provide some assessment for the recent developments
in the level and extent of SC in Jordan, sheds more light on the
usefulness and limitations of such sources.3.
(a) Social networks in Jordan during the pre-independence
period
Informal social-based networks and relationships—in the
form of family, kinship, and clan—have always played an
important role in Jordan’s social life. Although the region
saw several empires come and go, including the Greek, Ro-
man, Byzantine, and Ottoman, these powers showed interest
in, and extended inﬂuence to only those rain-fed cultivated
areas that could be taxed more easily. Nomad tribes were kept
independent of central authority. To lessen tribal raids on set-
tled areas and main trade routes, heads of tribes (shaykhs)
were paid a tribute (surrah) by foreign powers (Cunningham
& Sarayrah, 1993; Gubser, 1973; Peake, 1958). Tribal values
of family and social solidarity were reinforced by Islam’s
strong emphasis on the signiﬁcance of family, social solidarity
(takaful al Ijtima’i), and mutual assistance. They thus re-
mained a powerful social force even after these powers de-
parted.
Today this social network-based system is referred to in Jor-
dan, and in the wider Middle East, as wasta, and it remains in
the present day an important feature of social, economic, and
political life of modern Jordan just as it was decades ago.Was-
ta exempliﬁes the personalized approach to social and political
life. It literally means ‘‘to employ a middle man, a broker, a
go-between or an intermediary—usually a person of high so-
cial status and accepted rank—to achieve one’s ends” (Fathi,
1993, p. 61). In modern language, wasta means a connection
or inﬂuence.
It is important to further clarify the diﬀerence between the
concepts of wasta and social solidarity (takaful al Ijtima’i).
The latter is an important form of bonding SC, while wasta
is potentially more a form of bridging SC. Although originally
both were socially constructed concepts, social solidarity is
strengthened by Islam’s strong emphasis on social cohesion,
charity, social justice, collective responsibility for the welfare
of society, the legitimate claims of the weak upon community,
and the duty to help the poor and strangers at all times and
regardless of economic and social circumstances. For example,
the Quran, the primary source of Islamic law, ‘‘uses the word
‘justice’ more than a thousand times. . . based on ‘goodwill’”
and beneﬁt to Muslim society (Richards & Waterbury, 1996,
p. 351).
On the other hand, people resorted to wasta as a mechanism
to solve local and community disputes, to facilitate the man-
agement of common scarce resources, and to negotiate with
and intercede in dealings with central authorities under the
Romans, Byzantines, 8 and Ottomans. Under the British rule
during 1921–46, several factors reinforced wasta at both the
macro (state) and micro (society) levels. At the state level,
the new ruler of the country, Prince Abdullah, sought advice
from tribal leaders on the educational and skill levels as wellas on qualiﬁcations of their tribe members. Literate tribe
members were used to staﬀ his nascent administration. These
new oﬃcials became an important source of inﬂuence and con-
nection for their families and tribes inside the state apparatus,
interceding on their behalf for state beneﬁts, such as jobs, pub-
lic services, and infrastructure (Cunningham & Sarayrah,
1993, chap. 1).
At the society level, the tribes, who remained suspicious of
the British-backed central authorities, kept the formal govern-
mental system out of their aﬀairs. They continued to solve
their disputes and manage their common resources informally
and through traditional social customs and norms (Braizat,
1998). This was reinforced, especially in rural areas, by the
inherited Ottoman Mushi system of collectively owned land.
The Mushi ensured that members of the same family and kin
lived and worked together, thus facilitating cooperation and
maintaining the durability of family ties and social networks 9
(Amadouny, 1994). Such ties provided important psychologi-
cal assistance, political security, and social and economic re-
sources and beneﬁts to members such that it was not
possible to ‘‘imagine living in a diﬀerent land” or place with-
out such forms of social ties.
Through wasta, local citizens not only bonded together
along social and geographic dimensions (same tribe, clan, re-
gion, or people of the same background), but also simulta-
neously bridged across others. Members of certain clan,
tribe, or region resorted to wasta to intermarry from other
clans and tribes, solve disputes, and even to build alliances
and social and economic networks with other, more diﬀerenti-
ated groups. Wasta thus helped people to cope with the harsh
conditions of the desert environment and scarce resources. 10 It
also substituted for the lack of a formal welfare system, thus
playing an important informal social safety net role (Cunning-
ham & Sarayrah, 1993).
Norms of reciprocity play an important role in wasta. This
reciprocity was not based on an immediate tit for tat exchange
between the beneﬁciary and provider of wasta (e.g., I will do
this for you only if you do that for me). Rather, it was based
on the expectation that either the beneﬁciary himself or a
member of his family would one day return the favor. Cunn-
ingham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 8) captured this deﬁnition of
reciprocity in their description of a wasta performer in a com-
mon accident or conﬂict resolution in Jordan:
‘‘Today I or one of my relatives is the victim; tomorrow, or a year from
now, we may become the defendant. If we do not show forgiveness,
mercy and tolerance to others in their diﬃcult times, we will not be
shown tolerance by others when we are in distress. [Hence the popular]
Arabic saying, ‘you reap what you plant’.”
Although the components of a wasta-based settlement
include an important gift-giving element and exchange ele-
ment, the latter was not based on material rewards. It was con-
sidered ‘‘ayeb” (shameful) to demand and accept material
rewards for helping others (Gubser, 1973, p. 37). Respect from
the community was the highest reward sought by a wasta per-
former, mainly from tribal shaykhs and notables. Success in
solving a conﬂict led to mutual praise and enhanced the pop-
ularity and social and political status of the whole tribe. Medi-
ating and interceding on behalf of others was thus essential to
Jordan’s social identity (Fathi, 1993).
It is important to avoid simply romanticizing the nature of
social capital (Robins, 2004, p. 10). Things were not always
rosy in Transjordan. For example, several revolts by some
local tribes against the regime have been well documented else-
where (Gubser, 1973). Some tribes were also disgruntled by
what they perceived as a favorable treatment provided by
the regime to other individuals and tribes. Although social
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to resources than others.
However, Transjordan, compared with its neighbors, still
enjoyed tremendous political stability and economic prosper-
ity. This attracted a relatively large number of immigrants
from neighboring states, particularly from Syria, Palestine,
and Lebanon long before the outbreak of the 1948 war (Ama-
wi, 1994). But immigration into Jordan took a diﬀerent scale
after 1948, bringing tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees
into an overwhelmingly tribal society. The political and eco-
nomic environments that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s al-
lowed for bridging SC to form quickly between
Transjordanians and their new Palestinian guests.
(b) Social capital and population movement: the 1950s and
1960s
Following the 1948 war against Israel, more than 820,000
Palestinians were forced to leave their homeland; 320,000 of
whom stayed in the West Bank as refugees, 210,000 in the
Gaza Strip, 180,000 went to other Arab sates while 100,000
came to the newly independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
(Zureik, 1996, pp. 2–12). In 1951, King Abdullah I formally
annexed the West Bank to Jordan and gave all Palestinians
Jordanian citizenship, hitherto the only Arab leader to do so
in the region.
For most observers, Jordan’s 1950s, and to a lesser extent
1960s were decades of political turmoil, unrest, and tension be-
tween state and society (see, e.g., Brand, 1994; Dallas, 1999;
Joﬀe, 2002; Lerner, 1958; Piro, 1998; Robins, 2004). This focus
on the political was at the expense of the social. Little atten-
tion has been paid to the equally important issue of intercom-
munal relationships, particularly the relationship between
‘‘Palestinians-Transjordanians [which] remain largely unex-
plored, except, to a limited extend, as a direct function of
the PLO-Jordanian relations” in the post-1971 period (Brand,
1995, p. 46).
Although the ﬁrst few years of the late King Hussein’s reign,
speciﬁcally the period 1953–57 ‘‘was an extremely unstable
time for Jordan politically. . . during the 1950s and 1960s Jor-
dan experienced sustained growth in its gross domestic prod-
uct of about 8 percent” 11 (Piro, 1998, p. 30).
Notwithstanding economic factors (including labor migration
to the Gulf, ensuing increase in remittances, and surge in US
grants to Jordan), social capital had also contributed to Jor-
dan’s prosperity and even political stability after 1957.
It is unquestionable that the period 1953–57 was character-
ized by political tension and unrest, culminating in the re-
gime’s decision to ban all political parties, dissolve the
parliament, and even to impose martial law in 1957. But this
was not regarded as ‘‘communal tensions” (CERMOC.,
1997, p. 111). Rather, it reﬂected many Jordanians’ dissatisfac-
tion with their then young King’s foreign policies, and was
instigated chieﬂy by external and regional factors 12 (Dallas,
1999; Richards & Waterbury, 1996; Snow, 1972). In fact, some
observers, like Dann (1989), for example, argued that there
was little evidence that the Palestinians played any role in
the street demonstrations and riots of that period.
Following the formal annexation of the two Banks of the
River Jordan in 1951, Jordan became a state with two coun-
tries. But whether a citizen saw him/herself as a Palestinian
or a Jordanian did not really matter. To a large extent, the re-
gime itself followed a more or less balanced political approach:
‘‘The state’s goal was less to impose on Palestinians a Trans-
jordanian identity than to create a hybrid Jordanian identity
for both communities” (Brand, 1995, p. 50). This was alsoreﬂected in the cabinet as well, which was ‘‘well balanced:
every region was represented; half the ministers were from
the East Bank and half from the West Bank; there were two
Christians and one Circassian” (Dallas, 1999, p. 47).
In a recent analysis of the Zimbabwean villagers who reset-
tled in new areas, Barr (2001) noticed that, when faced with
low stocks of traditional kin-based social capital, villagers
use their resettlement in new areas to build social networks
and a stock of social capital with their new neighbors. They
do this by encouraging themselves and their oﬀspring to inter-
marry and form civil associations in their new environment:
‘‘Intermarriages facilitate informal insurance, while the emer-
gent civil society provides an environment within which trust
can develop” (Global Poverty Research Group., 2005, p. 2).
This analysis is consistent with the resettlement experience of
Palestinian inﬂux in Jordan during the 1950–60 period.
Seeking a fresh start, the immigrants immediately began a
process of building new stocks of social capital in their new
environment, and became cooperative and socially and eco-
nomically active. They immediately began the process of build-
ing trust, informal insurances, and a stock of SC through
intermarriages and participation in civil society organizations.
The latter was facilitated by the new, 1951 constitution that
boosted, albeit temporarily until 1957, political freedom and
right to associate, leading to a proliferation of political parties
and other civic associations that had been well documented
elsewhere (see Dann, 1984; El-Said, 1996; Joﬀe, 2002; Richards
& Waterbury, 1996; Satloﬀ, 1994; Vatikiotis, 1967; Wilson,
1987). While analyzing the Jordanian–Palestinian relationship
in this period, Brand (1995, p. 50) concluded that ‘‘Not surpris-
ingly, intermarriage between Palestinians and Transjordani-
ans. . . [was] more common than previously” expected.
The immigrants, although mostly refugees, brought with
them new skills, experiences, and above all, a lot of capital.
According to Piro (1998, p. 28), the inﬂux of Palestinians
brought more than twenty million Palestinian pounds, which
exceeded, by far, the total money supply in Jordan at the time.
This was invested locally in new, small industries, real estate,
and services. Many large Palestinian businesses, including
the giant Arab Bank, relocated to Amman (Robins, 2004, p.
84). The upshot was a remarkable building and business
boom.
The international community also assumed its responsibili-
ties. UNRWA (The United Nations Relief andWorks Agency)
was established in late 1949 and created four main camps 13 to
provide international relief eﬀorts and address the needs of the
refugees. It provided basic services and staples, including
health, education, and food therefore enabling the refugees to
better cope with the trauma of dispossession and easing the
pressure on the state’s limited resources. UNRWA’s eﬀorts
were supported by a rising level of international grants to Jor-
dan, thus enabling the government to better cope with the large
inﬂux of refugees (Al-Jumrid, 2000). The government was even
encouraged to establish the Ministry of Refugees and the Min-
istry of Welfare in 1949 and 1951, respectively, to deal with the
economic hardship of the refugees and to provide a formal
safety net and protection to the Jordanian population as a
whole (Mishal, 1978).
High growth rates, availability of jobs at home and
abroad, 14 and the prevalence of an egalitarian social stratiﬁca-
tion led people to bridge communal or speciﬁc social dimen-
sions. Wasta played an important role in allowing bridging
SC to form very quickly between Jordanians and their Pales-
tinian guests. Both communities resorted to wasta in order
to cope with the pressures of daily life in an environment char-
acterized by general scarcity. For example, through wasta a
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jobs in civil administration and expanding public sector enter-
prises (Fathi, 1993). Palestinians also established strong busi-
ness and social networks with Jordanians, where wasta also
played an important role in facilitating the choice of business
partners and even laborers. Supported by a strong feeling of
Arab identity and nationalism, Jordanians and Palestinians
perceived their predicaments as one. They thus borrowed
money from one another, and jointly worked in bureaucracy
and public administration. Asking favors from each other
was common, and was not considered shameful or a source
of embarrassment. Availability of jobs meant stable incomes,
a fact which not only encouraged groups and individuals to
ask for favors from one another whenever the need arose,
but also allowed recipients to repay in kind in the future.
Day (1986, p. 64) noted that these networks were also rein-
forced and cemented by a rising number of intermarriages be-
tween the two communities.
Jordanians sympathized tremendously with the plight of
their new guests. The establishment of UNRWA and the Min-
istry of Refugees was seen not only as a necessity by most Jor-
danians, but also became a symbol of unity and support, not
jealously and envy. According to Abu-Odeh (1999), the 1951
formal uniﬁcation of the East and West Banks was accompa-
nied by the emergence of an informal alliance between the Pal-
estinians and Jordanians; they ‘‘worked voluntarily
together. . .Their ideology and programs were cross-commu-
nal, helping to unit the two peoples [leading to] unoﬃcial
routes toward integration-namely, the socio-economic and
political paths-[which] went unscathed.”
Even when the late King Hussein took a decision in 1957 to
ban all political parties and impose martial law, he was
encouraged, even urged to do so by many members of the Pal-
estinian business community and conservative landed elites
who felt threatened by the proliferation of communist and so-
cialist-Ba’athist ideologies calling, among other things, for the
redistribution of wealth (Singh, 2002). It was hardly surprising
therefore that the more business and professionally oriented
(then also pro-regime) civil organizations, particularly the
Muslim Brotherhood Movement and the Professional Associ-
ations (themselves established by Jordan’ early immigrant’s
community in the pre-independence period and with over-
whelming membership from Palestinians), were the only
movements to survive the ban (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
1997; Singh, 2002, p. 76).
After 1957, prominent members of the Palestinian commu-
nity focused their eﬀorts on ‘‘stav[ing] oﬀ a vibrant Palestinian
nationalist movement against the Hashemite rule” (Piro, 1998,
p. 29). They established, sometimes in their own private
houses and properties, important, informal civic institutions
and networks to replace the undermined formal institutional
networks. Such institutions, which became popular in Jordan
as al-Jam’iate (societies) or ‘‘diwans” (Trooquer & Al-Oudat,
1999, p. 44), met regularly and brought together members
from both communities (Jordanian and Palestinian) to discuss,
debate, and provide solutions to daily and common problems.
Their eﬀorts ‘‘moderated beyond recognition” the political
environment of the 1950s, and were largely responsible for
promoting political stability in the post-1957 era, albeit tem-
porarily (Singh, 2002, p. 77).
In sum, strong bridging social capital developed in Jordan
during this period and was associated with economic growth
and political stability, particularly after 1957. But this was
to be severely undermined by the activities of Palestinian guer-
rillas during 1966–69 which terminated in a civil war in 1970/
71, and by the ensuing state policies.(c) Planting the seeds of discord: post-civil war reconstruction—
1971–89
Prior to the 1967 war, the Jordanian regime could still take
pride in having managed to keep the West Bank, Jerusalem,
and other religious sites in Arab hands. But the 1967 war with
Israel dealt a ‘‘death blow” to this claim, as well as to the
country’s economy (Salibi, 1998, p. 222). The war deprived
the country not only of its most fertile land, but also of its
most developed sector and foreign exchange earner, namely,
tourism. As the late King Hussein put it: ‘‘the loss of the West
Bank endangered Jordan’s very existence” (Braizat, 1998, p.
131).
The war also brought another large wave (400,000) of dis-
placed Palestinians, thus severely straining the country’s lim-
ited natural resources and infrastructure (World Bank, 2004,
p. 1). The creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) in 1964, with the aim of librating all of Palestine from
Israeli occupation through armed struggle, ushered in a new
era of tense societal relations between Jordanian and Pales-
tinian communities and meant the inevitable destabilization
of Jordan’s political regime. The PLO relied on a network
of individuals and groups bound together by a common ide-
ology and norms of reciprocity to achieve its goals. To this
end, their guerrillas resorted to unpopular tactics, including
kidnapping, plane hijackings, rule and regulation bypassing,
and executing insigniﬁcant military operations against Israeli
targets which led to harsh and disproportional Israeli repri-
sals against Jordanian towns and villages. The situation cul-
minated in an armed civil conﬂict in 1970–71, between the
Jordanian armed forces and Palestinian guerrillas which re-
sulted in ousting of the guerrillas and their sympathizers to
Lebanon in 1971.
SC is increasingly recognized as an essential element of
peace building and post-war (including civil war) reconstruc-
tion (World Bank, 2002). Under these circumstances, special
mechanisms and processes are needed to promote tolerance
and reconciliation among former warring groups and individ-
uals. Building a new consensus requires improvement in gov-
ernance structure, clean and eﬃcient bureaucracy, fair and
eﬀective courts and judicial system. It also requires eﬀectual
mass media and an educational system that endorses mutual
trust, provides support needed to heal wounds, and increases
the probability of social connectivity by re-knitting social fab-
ric. All of this calls for and can be facilitated by political com-
petition and liberalization to support associational life, and to
provide equal access to state facilities, services, resources, and
opportunities (Narayan, 1999, pp. 10, 36). This did not occur
in Jordan.
To be sure, the armed conﬂict itself did not cause ‘‘cracks in
the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship at community level;”
the SC that had developed between the two communities dur-
ing the earlier period protected and facilitated ‘‘their contin-
ued co-existence.” 15 Nevertheless, the activities of the
guerrillas and the ensuing conﬂict created a psychological rift
between the two communities, and ‘‘awakened, for the ﬁrst
time, a strong and vocal patriotism among the many Jordani-
ans who remained loyal to the Hashemite throne” (all quota-
tions from Braizat, 1998, pp. 143, 231).
For Jordanian nationalists, 16 the issue of origin became of
paramount importance. Palestinians came to be seen as guests
whose presence in the army, security, and public sector repre-
sented a threat to Jordanian national identity. Local national-
ists began viewing Palestinians with perﬁdy, and were
determined to exclude them from access to state apparatus
and opportunities.
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itated by the mopping up operation that followed the 1970–71
clashes and aimed at purging dissident elements, both Palestin-
ians and Jordanians (Yorke, 1988, pp. 13, 41). It was also
made possible by the triangular alliance that emerged between
the three main state departments that monopolize coercive
powers in the country: security, Mukabarat (secret intelligent
department), and the army. With new regulations making
the attainment of all posts in the state sector contingent on
a recommendation letter and a seal of approval of the Muk-
habarat, a process of ‘‘Jordanization” was set in motion and
was to prove eﬀective in achieving its goals, with far-reaching
social and economic implications 17 (Abu-Odeh, 1999).
King Hussein was well aware of the importance of social
capital for social cohesion, political stability, and hence for
growth and development. He wanted to heal the wounds after
the civil war ended and achieve national unity. 18 But he could
not row against the tide of East Bank Jordanian nationalists,
who now became the backbone of the regime and demanded
an exclusive Jordanian state sector. Hence, ‘‘King Hussein
started to reduce the Palestinian presence in his regime and
administration” and began relying more heavily on Jordanians
(Braizat, 1998, p. 157). Leading representatives of loyal Jorda-
nian families were co-opted into inﬂuential positions in the
cabinet, civil administration, army, and security.
Other regime policies have also directly and deliberately
undermined bridging SC in the country and have instead
strengthened bonding SC. To prevent the possibility of an
independent, more broadly based opposition from emerging,
or simply any ‘‘signiﬁcant challenges to his authority,” the re-
gime played a game of stoking communal tension between the
two communities 19 (Singh, 2002, p. 76). As Brand (1995)
wrote:
‘‘Anecdotal evidence over the years suggest that the regime is not
above exploiting such tensions (generally by encouraging the expres-
sion by Transjordanians of various forms of anti-Palestinianism)
when it sees ﬁt. By the same token, the regime is equally conveying
the message to curb such expressions when they risk getting out of
hand. Thus when tensions had reached new heights in mid-June
1994. . .King Hussein railed against those working to plant the ‘seeds
of discord in this country among its people’ and vowed that ‘any per-
son who attempts to harm national unity will be my enemy until
judgment day’.”
At the same time, Jordan’s associational life was formally
restricted after 1971. For example, the Parliament was sus-
pended indeﬁnitely in 1974, and remained so until 1989. Mar-
tial law, in place since 1967, was maintained and new
emergency measures kept in place the ban on political parties.
Even the only legal forms of civil associations which were per-
mitted by the government, namely, the professional associa-
tions and the Muslim Brotherhood, were also tightly
controlled and monitored by the state (El-Said, 1996; Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1997).
While Hussein co-opted loyal elements of Jordanian families
into inﬂuential state positions with little regard for merit or
competence, they in turn co-opted their family members, rela-
tives, and close friends too. Tribal and regional ties (bonding
SC) were promptly revitalized at the expense of bridging SC:
‘‘When the Jordanian bureaucracy expanded. . . after the 1960s, an
agency head would ﬁll positions with employees from his extended
family of origin. For example, a cabinet minister would appoint many
people from his town. Their qualiﬁcations and job performance would
be questionable. . . Gradually, Jordanian public institutions have come
to constitute diﬀerent groups and power centers, such as ‘‘shamalat
(Northerners), Saltiyyiah (Saltit), Sharkus (Circassians), Janoub
(Southerners), andMesihiyyih (Christians)” (Cunningham & Sarayrah,
1993, pp. 10, 46).”By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a division of labor, based
on ethnic lines, developed in Jordan. Jordanians came to dom-
inate the public sector, including public enterprises, civil
administration, security, and the army. On the other hand,
Palestinians, whose legal and political rights had been under-
mined by the post-1971 measures, came to dominate the pri-
vate sector. 20
Abu-Odeh (1999), the former political adviser to King Hus-
sein, provides graphic detail of the evolution of social and
state-society relations in Jordan during this period. The formal
state system became completely skewed, totally tilted in favor
of Jordanians, and very suspicious of Palestinians and vice ver-
sa. ‘‘Problems of mutual conﬁdence. . . [thus] emerged. . . be-
tween the Jordanian political elite which includes a
respectable number of Jordanians of Palestinians origin 21—
and the Palestinian political elite (mainly the. . . PLO). . .”
(Al-Hamarneh, 2002, p. 174).
Under these circumstances, tribal origin and aﬃliation be-
came the ticket to state resources and opportunities, as well
as to positions of decision making and inﬂuence. Personal con-
nections, or wasta, came to determine almost everything from
jobs in the state sector, to access to elite education and quality
health services to simple rights and entitlements such as the
acquisition of a passport or a driving license. Even the state’s
judicial system, the main guarantor of justice, became more
sympathetic, biased and even lenient with crimes, violations,
and oﬀences committed by Jordanians, including the abuse
of public oﬃce for private gains (Abu-Odeh, 1999).
It is interesting to compare the change that occurred in the
nature and extent of wasta in the post-1970–71 period, a point
which will also be elaborated on in the later sections. The
change in public policy in particular which took place after
the civil war, along with rise in poverty and unemployment
since the mid-1980s, aﬀected the functioning of wasta itself.
While wasta seemed to be helpful in building bridging social
capital in good times and in a supportive public policy envi-
ronment, it came to play a harmful role, a tool to strengthen
bonding social capital at the expense of bridging social capital
in bad times characterized by biased and corrupt public policy.
Ali and Crain (2002) argued that economic freedom might
be more important for economic growth and innovation than
political freedom. But even in the case of the Jordanian private
sector, Palestinians were beleaguered, and their innovative and
entrepreneurship spirit was undermined 22 by suspicious public
sector oﬃcials. Abu-Odeh (1999, p. 197) documented ‘‘stories
of civil servants who obstruct Palestinian oﬃcial transac-
tions. . . in Jordan.” This led Brand (1994) to describe the rela-
tionship between the Jordanian public and private sectors as
parasitic, not only distrustful of each other but also predating
on each other, thus undermining general trust, collective deci-
sions, and actions for common interests. This situation created
an insider and outsider phenomenon in the economy. Civil ser-
vants and state oﬃcials (insiders) predate on and obstruct the
activities of the private sector (outsiders and overwhelmingly
Palestinian). The outcome is high transaction costs, stiﬂed pri-
vate initiative, and copious obstacles to investment (El-Said &
McDonald, 2002).
To reduce transaction costs and/or facilitate their private
activities, Palestinian businessmen had to develop various
strategies and tactics (see El-Said, 1996, chap. 5). One such
strategy was to bribe state oﬃcials in order to keep the wheels
of their businesses rolling. Another was to employ, or even to
give shares to a prominent Jordanian whose main job is to
make sure that his company’s oﬃcial transactions get through
obstructive bureaucracy. These appointments depend on the
connections of the Jordanian, not on his merits: ‘‘The higher
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criminatory stance of Jordanian bureaucracy created new
job opportunities, and perhaps a new way of distributing in-
come in favor of their higher connected cronies (Abu-Odeh,
1999, p. 197. Also see El-Said and McDonald (2001), El-Said
and McDonald (2002).
Some individuals with original roots outside Jordan went
further to ‘‘Jordanize” their names, that is, ‘‘to changing their
name to reﬂect a tribal origin” in order to cement their links
and form working alliances with top state oﬃcials 23 (Fathi,
1993, p. 249). This, they hoped, would improve their chances
of acquiring a state contract, employment, or other state ben-
eﬁts. Yet, a large number of those who lacked a tribal aﬃlia-
tion and/or resented the culture of wasta (including some
Jordanians themselves) opted for an exit strategy. They simply
sought work abroad, particularly in the Arab Gulf oil-rich
states. By the early 1980s, more than 400, 000 Jordanians,
mostly of Palestinian origin, were working in the Gulf, remit-
ting back to their families and to the Jordanian economy more
than U$ 1 billion annually 24 (Anani, 2002; Kanaan &
Kardoosh, 2002).
To be sure, the intercommunal divide was also fashioned by
the Palestinian political elite, if with diﬀerent input and for dif-
ferent reasons. After the ousting of the PLO from Jordan in
1971, competition between Palestinian authorities and the Jor-
danian regime over the loyalty of Palestinians in the Arab
World, including in Jordan and the West Bank increased dis-
turbingly. This competition was intensiﬁed following an Arab
league resolution in 1974 which recognized the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, ‘‘a move
that directly challenged King Hussein’s claim to the loyalty
of West Bank Palestinian citizens, and not only heightened
intercommunal tension but also played a role in the king’s
decision to suspend indeﬁnitely the activity of the Jordanian
parliament, where half the seats had been apportioned to West
Bank representatives” (Brand, 1995, p. 53). The PLO started
to exploit the rising communal tension to its own advantage.
To gain support among Palestinian refugees, the PLO began
making large ‘‘social service provisions in camps” inside Jor-
dan, including direct cash handouts to many of its supporters
(Al-Hamarneh, 2002, p. 176).
The post-1970 political, social, and economic environment
stands in stark contrast to that which prevailed in the 1950s
and 1960s. After the 1970–71 civil war, the negative bonding
aspects of social capital came to outweigh the positive bridging
elements. As Al-Hamarneh (2002, p. 187) wrote: ‘‘The earlier
years of political cooperation in government between Jordani-
ans and Palestinians in the 1950s and 1960s had been com-
pletely forgotten.” Worse, bribery, corruption, and nepotism
sapped the capacity of the state, and created a wasteful and
ineﬃcient public sector that drained the treasury. 25 The new
political environment has been dominated by narrow primor-
dial relations that were not conducive to sustainable growth
and development.
However, it was not until the second half of the 1980s that
the negative eﬀects of eroded SC were felt. In the 1970s and
early 1980s, Jordan was awash with foreign aid, particularly
from the Arab oil-rich states, which temporarily ‘‘soothed
the rawness of conﬂicting identity and interests” (Robins,
2004, p. 3). Along with a high level of remittances, this fueled
economic activities, leading to an unprecedented high real
GDP growth rate of 7.9% during 1972–82 before declining
to 5.7% during 1982–86 (Harrigan & El-Said, 2009a). As soon
as external rents began drying up in the early and mid-1980s,
Jordan’s economic and social problems began to surface. Fol-
lowing a twin banking and currency crisis in 1989, the govern-ment of Jordan turned to the IMF and World Bank for
support. The year 1989 also marked the eruption of Jordan’s
ﬁrst large civil unrest in almost three decades. Ironically, the
rioters were Jordanians, the backbone of the regime, not Pal-
estinians. The erosion of generalized mutual trust and bridging
social capital had undermined social cohesion and political
stability of the country.
(d) Social capital and state policies in the post-1989 economic
crisis
In economic terms, the 1989 reform program, which ended
almost ﬁfteen years later in 2005, was met with mixed success.
The early and late 1990s were characterized by economic
recession whilst the mid-1990s and the early 2000s saw spurts
of growth. However, the growth was largely extensive caused
by increasing factor inputs especially returnee labor, Iraqi
immigrants, and the savings of both groups rather than inten-
sive growth caused by productivity gains (Harrigan & El-Said,
2009a). As such, the reform program failed to tackle the coun-
try’s growing unemployment and poverty problems and the
period since 1989 has been characterized by increased unem-
ployment, poverty, and inequality. During 1997–2002 unem-
ployment rose from 8.0% to estimates that range from
13.7% to 27.0% and the poverty headcount rose from 3.0%
to estimates that vary from 15% to 30% (Harrigan & El-Said,
2009b). 26
The process of Jordanization was not only maintained, but
also accelerated and intensiﬁed following the 1990/91 Gulf
war, which forced the return of more than 300,000 Jordanians
formerly working in the Gulf and mostly of Palestinian ori-
gin. 27 One of the main aims of the structural adjustment pro-
gram promoted by the IMF and World Bank since 1989 was
to reduce the economic role of the state, including public
employment, expenditure, and subsidies, and to strengthen
the role of the private sector. Given a Jordanian-public sec-
tor/Palestinian-private sector divide, ‘‘Transjordanians felt
threatened by the economic restructuring from which Palestin-
ians seemed poised to beneﬁt,” while Transjordanians seemed
to be ‘‘gradually losing control of their country to successive
waves of outsiders. . .” (Brand, 1995, pp. 55, 56). These fears
were primarily responsible not only for accelerating the Jord-
anization process, but also for triggering a ‘‘de-Palestinianiza-
tion process” aimed at undermining the presence of
Palestinians in key private sector enterprises and projects,
including particularly the press and state universities, thus
depriving Palestinians of ‘‘cheaper and more prestigious state
universities” 28 (Abu-Odeh, 1999, pp. 215, 227).
It was not surprising therefore that the returnees, who
brought back with them billions of dollars from their life sav-
ings in the Gulf and invested them in Jordan, found it diﬃcult
to adjust to living in Jordan: The returnees ‘‘feel little sense of
attachment to or understanding of Jordan as a country”
(Brand, 1995, p. 49). They are seen as ‘‘outsiders,” competing
for already scarce employment and limited resources, and
blamed for ‘‘increasing the prices of everything,” particularly
rented accommodation, food, and energy (UNDP, 2004, p.
43, 62).
The communal division of labor between a Jordanian public
sector and a Palestinian private sector itself became a source of
tension and envy between the two communities. While Jorda-
nians envy Palestinians’ dominance of more dynamic and
higher wage private sector activities, Palestinians envy Jorda-
nians’ dominance of the public sector and ‘‘the fringe beneﬁts
that go with government jobs, such as health insurance and
subsidized goods (food, clothes, and appliances)” (Abu-Odeh,
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satisﬁed with the status quo. Opinion polls suggest that neither
Palestinians nor Jordanians are happy with what they do, and
both were reminiscing ‘‘those days. . . [when life] was good”
(DFID, 2001, p. 11).4.
(a) Measuring social capital in Jordan
Like elsewhere, measuring SC in Jordan is not easy. Assess-
ing the full impact of SC decline is plagued by problems re-
lated to the quantity and quality of data. Several qualitative
studies on poverty and social relations were carried out in Jor-
dan since the early 1990s (e.g., see Abu-Odeh, 1999; CSS,
2003a, 2003b; Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1993; DFID, 2001;
El-Said, 1996; Fathi, 1993; ICG, 2003a, 2003b; Reiter, 2002;
Shaban, Abu-Ghaida, and Al-Naimat, 2001; UNDP, 2004).
Ironically, none of these studies cited earlier work on or used
the term SC as a theoretical framework in their attempt to
encapsulate the vitality of social and community relations,
or as an analytic framework to study increased poverty, cor-
ruption, nepotism, and weak enforcement of the rule of law
and regulations. The only exception is the 2004 UNDP Jordan
Human Development Report, whose main aim was not really
to investigate or measure SC, but rather to analyze the impact
of the economic and political shocks of the past ﬁfteen years
on the poor and on their coping strategies. This report, never-
theless, provides important information on the nature and
function of SC and social networks in an environment charac-
terized by scarcity and increased poverty. It is also the only
study that refers to the term SC, albeit very brieﬂy and in a
short section that does not exceed one and a half page. The re-
port is based on consultation with over 800 rural and urban
community members, in seven diﬀerent communities and with
around 25 local and national institutions. The 2004 UNDP
Report will therefore provide a reference point for most of
the analysis in this section, unless otherwise stated. Another
important source used intensively in this section is opinion poll
surveys initiated in the mid-1990s and maintained by the Cen-
tre for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan.
These valuable surveys provide important proxies to measure
and analyze various dimensions of SC in Jordan.
The above studies and others clearly point to a decline in so-
cial capital in Jordan since the beginning of the post-1989 eco-
nomic reform program. The qualitative poverty studies carried
out since the early 1990s coincide in their ﬁnding that social
relations have experienced signiﬁcant changes and that the
country’s SC has deteriorated rapidly since ‘‘the recession in
the second half of the 1980s,” and particularly after the 1989
ﬁnancial crisis (CSS, 2003a, p. 16). These studies also reveal
that Jordanians at large are no longer satisﬁed with their lives
and that they are unanimous and aﬃrmative in their belief
that ‘‘No, the past was better” (DFID, 2001, p. 11).
Another important visible manifestation or dimension of
declining SC in Jordan is the small and falling membership
of voluntary civil organizations. A recent survey by the CSS
(2005, p. 15) found that only 15% of all Jordanians in 2005
were members in voluntary civil society organizations, such
as trade unions, professional associations, and clubs, down
from 17% in 2004. The 2005 annual ‘‘Run or Walk” charity
organized by the Care of Neurological Patients was marked
by a steady decline in the number of participants over the past
six years, a phenomenon observed in other charity campaigns
as well (The Jordan Times., 2005b). A recent study on volun-tary civil actions found that work of ‘‘committees, societies,
clubs, and working camps showed deterioration in the value
and results of their operations.” This deterioration, the study
noticed, is caused by ‘‘the lack of real desire to serve others,
lack of responsibility towards serving the society, and a pref-
erence for non-participation” among the youth as well as in-
creased ‘‘responsibilities” of life (all quotations from
Swalem, Al-Zayood, Rayan, & Sharabati, 2005, p. 2).
Even the simplest form of political participation, namely elec-
tions, has also been dwindling. For example, while 62% of eligi-
ble Jordanians went to the polls in the 1989 ﬁrst parliamentary
elections in almost three decades, this declined to 59% in the
elections of 2003 (CSS, 2003a). Another survey by the CSS
(2003b, p. 24) found that only 1.5% of all Jordanians belonged
to a political party in 2003. Jordanians are also disillusioned
with their democratic process. In the same survey, 77.6% and
83.2% of Jordanians, respectively, stated that they could not
take part in peaceful political activities or criticize the govern-
ment publicly because they feared of being tortured, either
themselves or members of their families, by the government’s
security forces. This reﬂects deterioration in the quality of polit-
ical life in the 1990s. The hard won gains of political reforms
achieved in 1989–91 were reversed, and the regime resorted
back to its old tactics of restricting the freedom of press, speech,
and associations (ICG, 2003a, 2003b). The pro-regime Jordan
Times. (2005a) recently warned that political ‘‘concerns cannot
be addressed at the expense of freedom of association.”
(b) The eﬀects of hardship, poverty, and economic reforms on
bridging and bonding social capital
The earlier sections focused on the eﬀects of public policy in
eroding bridging SC across communities in Jordan. This sec-
tion shows how increased hardship, poverty, and worsening
inequities along with more capitalist-orientated attitudes, have
further undermined not only bridging SC in Jordan, but also
what was left of bonding SC within communities.
Under economic stagnation and poverty, some of the issues
that facilitated social integration during the good times in the
1950s and 1960s became a source of tension and polarization
over the past decade. For example, the program introduced by
UNRWA29 following the 1948 war to assist Palestinian refu-
gees, began to arouse the resentment of Jordanian lower mid-
dle class families:
‘‘They can buy whatever they want. They receive help from the inter-
national agencies, while we don’t receive similar assistance” (A focus
group discussion with the poor, UNDP, 2004, p. 43).
The bi-communal divide fashioned by Jordanian national-
ists over the years has also had other far-reaching economic
and social implications, and, ironically, has posed more prob-
lems for Jordanians themselves in times of hardship. ‘‘The ex-
change value of social capital depends very much upon the
resources to which social networks give access to. . . previously
well connected individuals whose networks are embedded in a
declining sector. . . may ﬁnd their social capital has completely
eroded” (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004, p. v).
Since 1989, the Jordanian public sector has been put under
severe pressure as a result of market-oriented policies recom-
mended by the so-called Washington Consensus. The ﬁscal
and monetary constraints imposed by these institutions and
the immediate freeze on public sector wages and salaries as well
as on employment have signiﬁcantly reduced job opportunities
in certain categories of employment where the poorest and least
qualiﬁed Jordanians were traditionally absorbed. Privatization
not only reduced further employment opportunities, but also
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jobs in the public sector were thus deprived of their former
workplace in which materially important social networks can
be formed and maintained (UNDP, 2004).
The fact that most Palestinians opted to work in the private
sector, either by choice or due to lack of it and either in Jordan
or abroad, made them more dynamic and exposed to entrepre-
neurial skills. Therefore, despite rising poverty and unemploy-
ment generally in Jordan, the Palestinians were more prepared
to face the new global economy than their Jordanian counter-
parts, who relied mostly on easy and uncompetitive jobs in the
public sector that require little skill (Anani, 2002). As a prom-
inent Palestinian businessman put it:
‘‘We gave them [Jordanians] what they wanted, namely politics, and
we [Palestinians] focused on what we can do best, that is, private activ-
ities. Today, I feel sorry for most Jordanian towns and villages because
they are very poor” (personal interview, Amman, September 9, 2005).
Indeed, there is alarming empirical evidence (from the point
of view of the regime) which suggests that today villages and
towns that not only are inhabited overwhelmingly by Jordani-
ans but also rely overwhelmingly on public sector jobs, such
as those in ‘‘south Jordan consistently rank at the bottom of
the national list in terms ofmost of the basic indicators,” includ-
ing poverty, unemployment, living standards, literacy, and edu-
cation (ICG, 2003b, p. 7). These areas, once known for their
unconditional support for the regime, have also experienced
the highest rate of violence and political instability over the past
ﬁfteen years. During 1989–2002, these areas experienced at least
four major political crises, all of which involved acts of violence
and rioting. ‘‘Unlike the 1970–1972 conﬂict with the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, it was home grown, pitting security
services against indigenous Transjordanians—or as one of
many several prominent political leaders put it, against the re-
gime’s oldest and strongest constituents” (ICG, 2003b, p. 7).
Hardship and poverty have not only deepened the pre-exist-
ing bi-communal cleavages in Jordanian society, but also
undermined intra-community ties or bonding social capital
amongst the poor and within communities themselves. While
analyzing social networks in post-Communist Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, Kuehnast and Dudwick’s (2004), drawing on the work of a
long line of anthropological studies, showed that under scarcity
and poverty, reciprocal social networks contract with various
degrees of rapidity to the detriment of the poor and needy (Sah-
lins, 1972). This analysis ﬁts well the experience of the poor and
social networks in Jordan over the past ﬁfteen years. The avail-
able empirical evidence suggests that poverty has impacted on
the nature and function of social relations between the poor
and the better oﬀ within the same community or ethnic group.
Social networks are traditionally and historically an impor-
tant feature of Jordanian society. Reciprocal solidarity (taka-
ful) among community members is best demonstrated during
social events such as weddings, births, funerals, and eid cele-
brations. Consultation process with the poor in rural and ur-
ban communities suggests that increased poverty and
economic dislocation are causing them to withdraw from such
important traditional ceremonies and social-based reciprocal
networks:
‘‘Change in the economic situation. . . has aﬀected social relations. . .
poor families, unable to oﬀer tangible items, prefer not to partici-
pate. . . because the dignity of a man is based on his ability to repay
the debt of social events” (A Focus group discussion with the poor,
UNDP, 2004, p. 62).
DFID’s study of Poverty Assessment in Jordan (2001, pp.
18, 22) also reported similar ﬁndings when it noted that the
‘‘poor families. . . could not aﬀord having a social life orattending social events like wedding parties or exchanging vis-
its with their neighbors. . . because [they cannot] aﬀord it.”
Such ceremonies and life rituals provide important opportuni-
ties to cultivate and develop more resourceful networks and
connections. The withdrawal of the poor from them leads to
their further deprivation, isolation, and exclusion.
This is not to say that social networks cease to function or
that people are no longer relying on support from family,
friends, or neighbors. Social-based networks continue to be
an important survival strategy for the poor. ‘‘People in [poor]
and low-trust environments will transact more with close
friends and relatives than with strangers” (Knack & Keefer,
1997, p. 1256). Diﬀerently put, the nature of social networks
often changes during times of hardship. In Jordan, poverty
revitalized ‘‘tribal ties” among Jordanians in an attempt ‘‘to
protect themselves from the hardship of life” (CSS, 2003c, p.
20):
‘‘In all communities, the poor noted that they rely on connections
(wasta) to facilitate procedures and access to entitlements. Urban res-
idents. . . describe wasta as a magic wand promising job opportunities,
access to loans, cash assistance from NAF and access to better, dis-
counted health services. Those without wasta expressed their frustra-
tion and helplessness. . . without wasta, we cannot live” (A focus
group discussion with the poor, UNDP, 2004, p. 63).
However, the networks of the poor and better oﬀ are sepa-
rating and polarizing, with the social networks of the poor
becoming more horizontal, ‘‘work[ing] together to share re-
sources” and connecting the poor with other poor who have
fewer resources and potential to support each other UNDP,
2004, p. 8. As Bel-Air (2002, p. 156), while describing the
change in social structure and relations in Jordan since the late
1980s noted, ‘‘as the vertical ties of domination fade, horizon-
tal ties of solidarity [have been] strengthened among brothers,
cousins and other members of the same.”
Another important development relates to the nature and
function of wasta or connection itself in a more capitalist-
based society. While accessing rights and entitlements are
increasingly mediated by personal connections, money has
come to play a vital role in such transactions. Today, a wasta
performer no longer seeks social recognition and respect as the
main reward for his/her eﬀorts: ‘‘These ties are no longer
based on commitment to abstract principles or codes. Rather,
they may be considered a form of patron-client relationship,
based on mutual or reciprocal assistance and loyalty” (El-
Said, 1996, p. 140). Today, wasta performers expect material
gains for their eﬀorts, even when such transactions involve a
kin or a ‘‘relative who exchanges useful information in family
meetings, but also who pays generously” (Malhas, 1993). Un-
der the marketization of social and economic relations over
the past ﬁfteen years, traditionally unacceptable forms of reci-
procities, including the request for and obtaining of material
reward for wasta, have been redeﬁned and revalued, and,
along with other activities, such as trade, speculation, and
proﬁteering, are no longer unacceptable and are now seen as
indicators of enterprise and private initiative. 30
This phenomenon led to the emergence in Jordan of what
Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 14) described as ‘‘con-
tract-based wasta,” a process which not only leads to further
isolation and exclusion of the poor, but also keeps the doors
(and pockets) of oﬃcials wide open for bribery and corrup-
tion.
Bribery, corruption, and other forms of rent-seeking behav-
ior have become widespread in the country, and have in-
creased under neo-liberal market reforms promoted since
1989. Some donors have recently cautioned the Jordanian re-
gime against the noticeable increase in the level of corruption
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ducted by Transparency International (TI) and the Arab Ar-
chive Institute, revealed interesting results about the way
most Jordanians felt about corruption in their country.
According to the study, 93.5% of respondents believed that
bribery was a form of corruption, 72.3% did not think the gov-
ernment was serious in combating bribery, 59.6% believed that
bribery will increase in the years to come, and 50% of those
sampled said that they had in fact bribed in one form or an-
other. In attempting to explain the reasons behind this wide-
spread phenomenon, 52% of Jordanians said they believed
those who take bribes do it to feed their families, particularly
following the decline in the living standards of public sector
employees caused by the rise in the cost of living following
the collapse of the dinar in 1989 and freeze on public sector
wages. Another 35% of respondents saw corruption as caused
by greediness; oﬃcials ‘‘do it to become rich” (all ﬁgures
quoted in Hamzeh, 2006).
Understandably, these developments have negatively inﬂu-
enced the perceptions of all Jordanian citizens, regardless of
their origins, regarding their oﬃcials and state institutions.
Today Jordanian citizens seem less trusting not only of one an-
other, but also of their deputies and formal institutions. One
recent study concluded that the level of ‘‘interpersonal trust”
in the country is exceptionally low (Al-Breizat, 2002, p. 55).
Most Jordanians today believe that ‘‘corruption in Jordan is
too institutionalized and socially accepted,” and that the gov-
ernment ‘‘can do nothing to eradicate corruption” and nepo-
tism (Al-Abed, 2005).
Although much less explored and known about, the avail-
able empirical evidence suggests that a similar dynamic has
been taking place within the Palestinian community in Jordan.
In fact, analysts of Jordan get so tied up describing almost
‘‘exclusively” the Jordanian ‘‘ashira (large clan or tribe), as a
basis of aﬃliation and source of prestige and patronage” that
they forget the tribal and clan roots and nature of parts of Pal-
estinian society (Brand, 1995, p. 48).
Under the post-1970 and post-1989 environment, bonding
SC has also come under strain among Palestinians themselves.
Subsidy cuts in basic commodities as well as high unemploy-
ment and poverty levels in Jordan led to an ‘‘impoverished
condition of Palestinians in refugee camps” (Singh, 2002, p.
82). The situation was made worse for these camps by the fact
that the PLO’s ability to continue to support social networks
and social service provisions (as it had been doing since the
early 1970s) was undermined by its political stance over the
1990/91 Gulf war, which caused it to lose much of the ﬁnancial
support it used to receive from the oil-rich Gulf states (Al-
Hamarneh, 2002, p. 176).
The results of a 1997/8 study by Al-Hamarneh on four Pal-
estinian refugee camps in the Amman Metropolitan Area
(AMA), where more than 85% of the returnees from the Gulf
settled, 31 are revealing. The study noticed an important social
and economic stratiﬁcation developing among refugee camps
during the 1990s. Although ‘‘social networks” remained
important in the Camps’ social and political life, their nature
has also experienced signiﬁcant changes that seem to mirror
the economic stratiﬁcation developing inside these camps. This
change is reﬂected in the fact that members of the same groups
have also been forced to ‘‘hold together . . .to retain social
cohesion,” while the more educated with higher incomes have,
mainly as a result of increased demands and burdens placed on
them by the worse-oﬀ sections of the camps’ residence, been
moving out to new areas, thus increasing the ‘‘social isolation”
of remaining poorer residents (All quotations from Al-Hamar-
neh, 2002, pp. 183, 185).Based on a large survey of returnees, Trooquer and Al-
Oudat (1999, p. 39) noted that ‘‘while the returnees’ arrival
in Jordan could have been an occasion for strengthening the
extended family (taking in returnees, providing various forms
of ﬁnancial support), in fact it was not uncommon for family
ties to break under the weight of lifestyles that had diverged
too widely, overcrowded housing conditions, and, in a pre-
cious economy, fears on the part of the hosts of additional
‘burden’.” The survey reported that ‘‘almost all of the inter-
viewed returnees had relatives in Jordan when they arrived,
only about a quarter of them reported having received con-
crete assistance from them” (Trooquer & Al-Oudat, 1999,
pp. 39, 50)). The survey concluded that observing how social
networks, including family ties, are aﬀected by conditions of
scarcity challenges traditional notions of the primacy of ties
of blood or origin, and shows that ties between those sharing
a common lifestyle or residence to be stronger: ‘‘It should not
be surprising that friendship or old acquaintances from Ku-
wait formed the core of the returnees’ social circle” (Trooquer
& Al-Oudat, 1999, pp. 40, 41).
Very little is known about the associational life and partici-
patory rates in voluntary civil organizations inside Palestinian
refugee camps in Jordan. But the very little that is known also
points to a declining trend. For example, while 63% of those
registered to vote in the Palestinian refugee camps actually
voted in 1993, this declined to only 54% in the 1997 elections
(Al-Hamarneh, 2002, p. 177), and to below 50% in the 2002
elections (Joﬀe, 2002).5. CONCLUSION
This paper set itself the diﬃcult and broad task of tracing
the evolution of SC in Jordan, particularly bonding SC and
bridging SC, evaluating the role of state policies in aﬀecting
various forms of SC, and exploring the ways in which poverty
and economic reform aﬀect the nature and extent of SC.
A society initially rich with SC is no guarantee for sustain-
able growth and development. While SC takes a very long time
to form and build, it is easily destroyed. Indeed, this paper
cautions against the assumption that SC, particularly trust
and civic cooperative behavior, is stable over long periods of
time. Such behavior can disintegrate in the face of inappropri-
ate and biased state policies, wars, and civil wars, as well as of
poverty and hardship. All these factors can undermine various
forms of SC, including bridging SC that is so important for so-
cial cohesion and political stability. Under such circumstances,
group heterogeneity becomes more complex and divisive than
that under economic growth and prosperity. The case of
Yugoslavia’s rapid unraveling of cooperative behavior under
similar circumstances is also supportive of this argument. Such
an analysis also carries important policy implications.
SC is not a substitute for a good state. On the contrary, SC
and good states compliment each other. They also aﬀect and
are aﬀected by each other. While wars and civil wars can
quickly erode SC and cross-cutting ties, SC itself can play an
important role in post-war reconstruction and peace building.
But to achieve this objective, SC needs to be supported by a
good governance structure that supports and nourishes associ-
ational life. It also requires eﬀective and clean bureaucracy,
and just and eﬀectual courts and judicial system. Failing that,
social networks, which are characterized by resource and
power asymmetry, can lead to further social divisions, isola-
tion, and exclusions. Such divisions and chasms under poverty
and scarcity can develop not only between various communi-
ties and groups within the same society, but also between them
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dan in the post-1970–71 civil war.
Rushed and premature economic reform programs that are
not preceded by a good understanding of a society’s social
structure, social networks, and the resources they command
and control, can further increase a society’s hardship and pov-
erty by undermining both bridging and bonding SC. This is
particularly the case in societies where social networks that
are based on mutual exchange and reciprocity can contract
rapidly under poverty and hardship to the detriment of the
poor. During hard times, social networks become burdensome
for the poor who struggle to meet their more urgent needs such
as food, shelter, and clothes. In such an environment, the poorare less likely to devote time and resources to costly reciprocal
social networks. This short-term strategy undermines their
medium- and long-term access to wider resources and beneﬁts,
and contributes to their further isolation and exclusion.
Future policy intervention in Jordan must not repeat its past
mistakes and must be careful not to undermine further local
and community SC. This requires a complete reversal from
the current policies that cause bonding SC to take precedence
over bridging SC in Jordan. This policy recommendation not
only is necessary to produce more optimal development out-
comes, but is also necessary to promote social cohesion and
political stability, which are important for investment, growth,
and development.NOTES1. The concept of SC itself is not new and its application was traced back
to the early 19th century. As Putnam (2000, 24) put it, ‘‘Social capital is to
some extent merely new language for a very old debate.” It was not before
the work of Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995) that the term SC was put
ﬁrmly on the development agenda. In recent years, the World Bank played
an important role in enhancing understanding and measurement of SC,
and in 1997 it lunched The Social Capital Initiative that was funded by the
Danish government. For details, see Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002,
cha. 1) and World Bank website: http://wordbank.org/poverty/scapital/.
However, Farr (2004) has recently oﬀered by far the best and most
comprehensive attempt to trace the conceptual history of SC.
2. The nature and extent of this debate is discussed in Dasgupta and
Serageldine (1999).
3. Several chapters in Grootaert, Narayan, Nyhan Jones, and Woolcock
(2004) provide detailed information and several examples and case studies
on the role of social networks and social capital in accessing information.
On the informational role of SC among black community in the USA, see
Loury (1977), and in the Arab World in general, see Cunningham and
Sarayrah (1993).
4. This, of course, is contrary to the early literature on SC, which not
only tended to ‘‘romanticize” its eﬀects, but also to underestimate its
negative consequences (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, p. 138;
Narayan, 1999, p. 20).
5. Briggs (1998) is accredited for introducing the bonding ‘‘getting-by”
and bridging ‘‘getting-ahead” distinctions.
6. As Putnam (2000, p. 21) put it: ‘‘A society characterized by generalized
reciprocity is more eﬃcient than a distrustful society. . .. If we don’t have
to balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished.
Trustworthiness lubricates social life.”
7. Some of these dimensions are both cause and eﬀect at the same time.
For example, a rise in the crime rate can reduce security and hence
undermine social connectivity and visits as people prefer to stay at home
for safety reasons. But the rise in the crime rate itself might have been
caused by decline or erosion of SC. ‘‘Endogeneity of social capital,” or
determining the direction of causality, remains a key question in the
analyses of SC (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, p. 42). Several authors,
however, have established the link to run from SC. See Grootaert and Van
Bastelaer (2002), Narayan (1999) and Narayan and Cassidy (2001).
8. Of course, it might have not been calledWasta under the Romans and
Byzantines. But several historians show that such a phenomenon was very
common and widely practiced at the time (see, e.g., Cunningham &
Sarayrah, 1993).9. It is important to note here that the British authorities, which sought
to reduce Transjordan’s (Jordan’s name before independence in 1946)
heavy dependence on the British subsidy, regarded the Mushi system as
ineﬃcient and the most serious impediment to raising production and
hence tax revenues. By the mid-1930s, therefore, they sought to break it
up by introducing a new property rights law to enhance production and
at the same time state revenue. Although this process failed to raise
production and state revenues, it managed to gradually undermine the
Mushi system.
10. More than 90% of Jordan’s land is arid. Some fertile areas exist in the
Northern highlands, traditionally planted with wheat, but these are
without irrigation and are thus subject to the vagaries of rainfall. It is only
in the Jordan Valley area where a commercial, reliable and irrigated
agricultural sector exists.
11. Jreisat (1989, p. 95) also noted that the dramatic increase in the
number and heterogeneity of population did not evidently undermine
economic growth, which remained relatively high during the 1950s and
1960s, with GDP and GNP between 1952 and 1966, respectively,
registering 6.9% and 7.5% annual average growth rates.
12. As Snow (1972, pp. 71, 72), King Hussein’s biographer, while
describing the 1950s wrote: ‘‘Nasser’s militant campaign for Arab unity
excited the minds of the masses throughout the Arab world and many
Jordanians saw Nasser as their leader, not Hussein. Nasser’s power
seemed somehow born of the people, Hussein’s did not. Nasser’s ﬁght to
evict the British from the Middle East, in order to restore Arab dignity,
was a striking contrast to Hussein’s apparent wish to maintain and depend
on continuing British presence.”
13. Yet, the majority of Palestinians did not stay in refugee camps or
even register their names with UNRWA. Even today, less than 26 percent
of all Palestinians in Jordan are registered with UNRWA. This could also
provide another indication of the extent of support provided by the earlier
immigrants, which, as Al-Hamarneh (2002, 173) suggests was vital in
enabling a large number of Palestinians to ﬁnd jobs, housing and even
capital for either small business projects or simply for getting by in the new
environment.
14. Again, labor movement from Jordan to the expanding oil Gulf States
was beginning to gain momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, with thousands
of Jordanians ﬂocking to the region seeking higher paid jobs.
15. This was also supported by the fact that the general Palestinian
population of Jordan did not participate in the 1970–71 armed struggle
itself. In fact, the large majority of the Jordanian armed forces at the time
were made up of Palestinians who fought PLO ﬁghters along side
Jordanians.
‘‘YOU REAP WHAT YOU PLANT”: SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE ARAB WORLD—THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 124716. Abu-Odeh (1999) deﬁnes those nationalists to consist of middle class
Jordanians, a group of professionals, high ranked army and security
oﬃcers, and relatives and friends of the former prime minister -Wasﬁ al-
Tal- who was assassinated allegedly by the PLO in 1971.
17. Of course this process was not only used to Jordanize the public
sector, but also to penalize and undermine opposition to the regime from
all ethnic backgrounds, including elements of the Jordanian society who
were former members of the Baa’th, socialist or pan-Arabist movements.
18. Less than a year following the end of the 1970/71 clashes, Hussein
stated that ‘‘Last year’s events with all its distress and suﬀering. . .
enhanced my conviction and belief in setting up a national union that
brings together the people of the two dear banks and unites their
eﬀorts. . .” (Hussein, 1971).
19. Bel-Air (2002, p. 157) also concluded that the regime deliberately
constructed and fashioned ‘‘a neo-patriarchal political system in Jordan”
in order to increase ‘‘allegiance” to itself and maintain communal loyalty.
20. While the exact number or share of Palestinians in the public sector is
unknown, a study conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies at the
University of Jordan in 1996 suggested that Palestinian participation in
the country’s private capital amounted to 82.6%, while Jordanian
participation was only 11%. The rest was owned by Jordan’s main
minorities, namely, Circassians, Armenians, Kurds, Syrians and Lebanese.
See Abu-Odeh, 1999, p. 196.
21. This quotation is also interesting in that it suggests that the new post-
1970 environment had put the pro-regime, Palestinian wealthy class that
played an important role in moderating the political environment in the
1950s and 1960s in a diﬃcult position and undermined their eﬀorts in
persistently soothing and calming the rising tension between the two
communities in the post-1970 period.
22. Almost 98% of Jordanian ﬁrms are small and medium-sized. This
may correspond well with Fukuyama’s (1995) argument that societies with
primary as opposed to generalized mutual trust do not develop large size
ﬁrms.
23. While analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of SC among US Asian
community, Portes noticed a similar phenomenon taking place among
prosperous Asian immigrants to America, who ‘‘anglicized their names in
order to divest themselves of communal obligations to subsequent
cohort.” Cited from Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 231).
24. As mentioned earlier, movement of labor has always been a major
feature of the Jordanian economy. But there is some evidence, cited in
Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993) which suggest that social networks,Wasta, or SC was exerting excessive claims on more successful members of
Jordanian society such that they themselves opted for an exist strategy to
the Gulf.
25. Within a time span of ﬁfteen years alone during 1970–85, the
number of Jordanian civil servants increased by 300%—from 27,000 to
74,000 (Jreisat, 1989, p. 99). By 1988, the size of the regular armed
forces reached 85,000, from 25, 000 in 1956 (Satloﬀ, 1986, pp. 123,
130). Most of these appointments were based on regional and tribal
ties.
26. There is a big debate over the extent of poverty and unemployment in
Jordan. Reﬂecting this debate, the 2002 Poverty Alleviation Strategy
(MSD, 2002, p. 13) noted that ‘‘Poverty is a serious problem in Jordan.
Depending on the poverty line used, anywhere from 15 to more than 30
per cent of the population falls below that line” and anywhere between
‘‘13.7% and 25%” are unemployed.
27. According to Trooquer and Al-Oudat (1999, 37), about 95% of the
returnees were of Palestinian origin.
28. There are six state universities in Jordan today and at least 13
private universities. While the latter are open to all students, the former
tend to discriminate in favor of Jordanians. Reiter (2002, pp.152, 153)
argues that more than 80% of students in Jordanian public universities
enter via some form of wasta, known as the ‘‘quota framework” (such
as the army quota, the Royal Palace Quota, and the Sons of the
Deprived Quota), which are designed to favor Jordanian over Palestin-
ian students.
29. A similar trend was also observed by a World Bank study (2002) in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where support provided by international
community became a source of tension between various ethnic groups.
30. Amawi (1994) demonstrates how even involvement in trade was
considered ayeb by most Jordanian families in the pre-independence
period and was thus left for merchants who came mostly from outside the
country.
31. Ten Palestinian refugee camps exist in Jordan, four of which were
built after the 1948 war while the rest were built after the 1967 war.
The majority of these camps (at least six) are located in the so-called
Amman Metropolitan Area (AMA), which covers an area with a radius
of 35 km. While almost 85% of returnees settled in and near the refugee
camps in AMA, another 13% settled in Irbid where another large
refugee camp, built in 1949, is located. However, less than 26% of all
Palestinians in Jordan are registered as refugees with UNRWA. For
more details, see Al-Hamarneh, 2002, pp. 173, 174 and Trooquer & Al-
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